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II. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal from a final judgment entered by the Honorable Terry 
L. Christiansen of the Third Judicial District Court, West Valley Department, in 
and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah. The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction 
in this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (2002), whereby the 
Defendant in a district court criminal action may take an appeal to the Court of 
Appeals from a final order for anything other than a first degree or capital 
felony. Appellant was convicted of Resisting Arrest/Failure to Comply, a class 
B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-305; Possession of Drug 
Paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-
37a-5(l) (2003); Disorderly Conduct, a class C misdemeanor, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann., Section 76-9-102; and Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol 
and /or Drugs, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-
44 (1998). 
III. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES & STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
a) Issue 1. Did the district court err in failing to suppress evidence 
obtained from a blood draw where the Defendant did not consent, and where 
any alleged consent was not freely and voluntarily made? This issue was 
preserved for appeal through the filing of Defendant's Motion to Suppress and 
the trial court's ruling thereon. (R. 65-70 and 315, pp. 3-6) 
Standard of review. This Court *review[s] the factual findings 
underlying the trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion to suppress 
evidence using a clearly erroneous standard." State v. Veteto, 2000 UT 62, f8 
(citing State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 939 n.4 (Utah 1994)). "However, . . . the 
trial court's conclusions of law based on these findings [are reviewed] for 
correctness, with a measure of discretion given to the trial judge's application 
of the legal standard to the facts." Id. 
b) Issue 2. Did the district court err in failing to allow the defense to 
introduce evidence of prior assaultive behavior of the arresting officers 
pursuant to the self-defense statute which allows evidence of prior violence? 
This issue was preserved for appeal by Defendant's attempt to offer the 
evidence at trial, the City's objection thereto, and the trial court's ruling to 
sustain that objection. (R. 320 pp. 116, 125-128, and 182) 
Standard of review. "Because the admission of evidence under Rule 
404(b) is a question of law, it is reviewed for correctness. However, the trial 
court's subsidiary factual determinations should be given deference by the 
appellate court and only be overruled when they are clearly erroneous." State 
v. O'Neil, 848 P.2d 694, 695-696 (Utah App. 1993) (citing State v. Taylor, 818 
P.2d 561, 569 (Utah App. 1991)). "We review a trial court's decision to admit 
evidence under rule 404(b) . . . under an abuse of discretion standard. We 
review the record to determine whether the admission of other bad acts 
evidence was 'scrupulously examined' by the trial judge 'in the proper exercise 
of that discretion."' State v. Mead, 2003 UT App 39, J61 (citing State v. 
Nelson-Waggoner, 2000 UT 59, 1(16, 6 P.3d 1120)). 
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c) Issue 3. Was sufficient evidence presented to convict the Defendant 
of Disorderly Conduct? This issue was preserved for appeal by the jury's 
verdict convicting Defendant of Disorderly Conduct. (R. 319, p.354) 
Standard of review. This Court "review[s] the evidence of a jury verdict 
and all inferences that can be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to 
the verdict. State v. Richards. 779 P.2d 689, 690-91 (Utah App. 1989) (citing 
State v. Tolman. 775 P.2d 422, 424 (Utah App. 1989)). "We reverse such a 
verdict" only when the evidence is so lacking and insubstantial that a 
reasonable person could not have reached that verdict beyond a reasonable 
doubt." Richards. 779 P.2d at 691 (citing State v. Walker. 743 P.2d 191, 192 
(Utah 1987)). 
IV. DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann.. Section 41-6-44.10 (attached as Exhibit A) 
Utah Code Ann.. Section 76-2-402 (attached as Exhibit B) 
Utah Code Ann.. Section 76-9-102 (attached as Exhibit C) 
V. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
The subject case is a criminal case wherein the Defendant was arrested 
and charged with Resisting Arrest/Failure to Comply; Assault against a Police 
Officer; Possession of Drug Paraphernalia; Disorderly Conduct and Driving 
Under the Influence of Alcohol and/or Drugs. (R. 01-06). 
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B. Course of the Proceedings 
Defendant entered pleas of not guilty to all charges and a demand for 
trial by jury. (R. 08-09) Prior to trial, Defendant filed a Motion to Suppress the 
blood test result stemming from Defendant's DUI arrest on the grounds that 
Defendant did not consent to the blood test and/or that his consent was not 
freely and/or voluntarily given. (R. 65-69) The trial court denied Defendant's 
Motion to Suppress. (R. 315, pp. 3-6) 
Prior to trial, Defendant also filed a Subpoena Duces Tecum to obtain 
copies of the arresting officers' personnel files, including any an all information 
pertaining to the officers'use of excessive force during other arrests. (R. 124-
125) The City filed a Motion to Quash the Subpoena Duces Tecum and a 
Memorandum in support thereof. (R. 114-123) Following a hearing on the 
Motion to Quash, the trial court determined that it would reviewr the subject 
personnel files, in camera, and would then release all potentially exculpatory 
evidence contained in the arresting officers' personnel files to defense counsel. 
(R. 317, p. 5) 
At trial, defense counsel attempted to introduce as evidence information 
from said files pertaining to prior instances wherein the officers had used 
excessive force or violence during arrests, including civil lawsuits that had been 
filed against the officers alleging such conduct. (R. 320 at p. 116) The City 
objected and the officers were questioned regarding this information outside of 
the presence of the jury. (R. 320 at pp. 116-124). The trial court then 
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determined that such information constituted inadmissible prior acts under 
Rule 404(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence and was not admissible under the 
self-defense statute. (R. 320 at pp. 125-128). At the conclusion of the trial, the 
case was submitted to the jury for verdict. 
C. Disposition 
After deliberating on the evidence, the jury returned a verdict of "Not 
Guilty" on Count II, Assault Against a Police Officer, and "Guilty* on all 
remaining counts. (R. 319 at p. 354) There were no post-trial motions filed by 
either party. 
D. Statement of the Facts 
Facts Surrounding Consent Issues 
1. On or about March 7, 2002, West Jordan Police Officer Saunders 
was dispatched to the vicinity of 8750 South 4560 West on the report of a 
suspicious vehicle. (R. 320, p.67, lines 21-23) 
2. Officer Saunders approached the subject vehicle and asked the 
occupant of the vehicle to produce his identification. Defendant complied with 
this request and provided Officer Saunders with his drivers license. (R. 320, p. 
72, lines 15-23). 
3. Following officer Saunders' initial contact with the defendant, 
Officer Kwant arrived on the scene and the two proceeded to ask Mr. Smith to 
exit his vehicle. (R. 320, p.78, lines 8-11) 
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4. Shortly after Mr. Smith exited his vehicle in compliance with the 
officers' request, a lengthy physical altercation occurred which resulted in Mr, 
Smith being physically injured as a result of his head being slammed into an 
open truck door, pepper spray that had been deployed, hits from the officers' 
fists and batons, and being subdued by additional officers. (R. 320, pp. 109-
114) 
5. Eventually, the Defendant was placed in both hand and ankle 
cuffs, and physically restrained by a number of officers. (R. 320, p. 153, lines 
2-16) 
6. Subsequently, a search warrant for a sample of the Defendant's 
blood was sought by Officer Hahn. Before obtaining the warrant, Officer Hahn 
spoke to Officers Saunders and Kwant, and the two officers explained to Hahn 
that there was quite a struggle; that Mr. Smith had been pepper sprayed; that 
in the altercation, officers had hit Mr. Smith with their fists and batons; that 
eventually there were quite a number of officers on the scene; and that a 
number of the officers had to hold Mr. Smith down and restrain him. (R. 314, 
pp. 30, 31 and 34) 
7. Further, in viewing Mr. Smith on the gurney being put into the 
ambulance, Officer Hahn saw that Mr. Smith's face was bloody and also later 
saw the injuries to Mr. Smith's body at the hospital. (R. 314, pp. 31-34) 
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8. Individuals were trying to interact with Mr. Smith and were 
requesting that he cooperate in receiving medical treatment. Mr. Smith did not 
want medical help. (R.314, p.28, lines 11-20) 
9. Officer Hahn never asked for consent at this time for a blood 
sample or any other chemical test. (R. 314, p. 19, lines 5-11 and pp. 35-36) 
10. Thereafter, Officer Hahn sought and obtained a blood draw search 
warrant from the justice court judge. Within the affidavit in support of that 
warrant, Officer Hahn admittedly made a number of false statements and 
omissions. (R. 314, pp. 40-45) 
11. In doing so, Officer Hahn swore that the Defendant "refused" or 
failed to perform a chemical test. After obtaining the warrant, Officer Hahn 
went to Jordan Valley Hospital to serve the warrant. (R. 314 pp. 40-45) 
12. When Officer Hahn arrived at Jordan Valley Hospital, Mr. Smith 
was located in an area of the emergency room. Another officer had been 
watching over Mr. Smith, and left when Officer Hahn arrived. (R. 314, p. 47, 
lines 14-25 and p. 48, lines 1-5) 
13. When Officer Hahn went into Mr. Smith's room, two nurses and a 
doctor were already treating Mr. Smith. One nurse was starting an IV and Mr. 
Smith had seemingly calmed down. (R. 314, p. 50) 
14. In the hospital room, Mr. Smith was still in cuffs and restrained to 
the hospital bed. He was not fighting against the restraints and was not yelling 
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obscenities. However, he was still a bit agitated and confused. (R. 314, pp. 49-
50) 
15. Mr. Smith complained of pain and was describing to medical 
personnel his injuries. (R. 314, p. 50, lines 7-16) 
16. Moreover, at the hospital, Mr. Smith was mainly under the watch 
of Officer Hahn. However, Officer Saunders was also at the hospital and would 
at times relieve Officer Hahn for breaks. (R. 314, p. 51 , lines 9-20) 
17. It is unknown what was said to Mr. Smith while under the watch 
of Officer Saunders, one of the individuals involved in the prior altercation. (R. 
314, p. 51 , lines 21-25; and p. 52, line 1) 
18. At some point, Officer Hahn attempted to obtain Mr. Smith's 
consent to a blood draw. (R. 314, p.52, lines 2-5) 
19. Officer Hahn claims that he informed Mr. Smith that he was under 
arrest for DUI and questioned Mr. Smith as to whether he understood. Mr. 
Smith allegedly responded, "I guess/ ' (R. 314, p.20, lines 9-14) 
20. Officer Hahn then read the admonition from the DUI form to 
request consent and requested a blood test. Mr. Smith allegedly responded, 
"Sure, 111 pee in a cup, too." (R. 314, p 21, lines 8-16) 
21 . Ultimately, the blood technician arrived and drew blood from Mr. 
Smith. The blood technician instructed Mr. Smith how to be cooperative, and 
Mr. Smith did not act counter to the instructions. (R. 314, p. 24) 
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22. In the context of these circumstances, the City decided to not rely 
on the warrant as a basis for the blood draw, but on consent and claimed that 
Mr. Smith consented to a blood draw. 
Facts Surrounding Issues of Officers' Prior Violence 
23. Prior to trial, counsel subpoenaed personnel files of three of the 
arresting officers. (R. 124-125) 
24. At trial, counsel sought to question the officers concerning 
allegations of prior unreasonable beatings during arrest. (R. 320 at p. 116) 
25. The City objected and the officers were questioned out of the 
presence of the jury. (R. 320 at pp. 116-124) 
26. In this questioning - (both had suits filed against them, and one 
had been accused on two prior occasions of overzealousness) - the district 
court judge found that such evidence was inadmissible prior acts under 404(b) 
and not admissible under the self-defense statute. (R. 320 at pp. 125-128) 
Facts Surrounding Issues of Insufficient Evidence of Disorderly Conduct 
27. Officer Saunders testified that Mr. Smith was "verbally 
belligerent" and called the officer names. (R. 320, p. 78, lines 19-21) 
28. Officer Saunders testified that Mr. Smith "resisted" the officers 
and had to be forced to the ground. (R. 320, p. 79, lines 17-25) 
29. Officer Saunders testified that he and Officer Kwant were trying 
to grab Mr. Smith's arms to take him into custody and Mr. Smith started 
screaming. (R. 320, p. 82, lines 1-2) 
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30. Officer Saunders offered testimony regarding a physical 
altercation that took place between the officers and Mr. Smith and 
acknowledges that during the altercation, the officers stuck Mr., Smith several 
times with batons and fists, pepper-sprayed him twice, took him down to the 
ground with a "hair pull" maneuver and were "yelling" at Mr. Smith to stop 
resisting. (R. 320, pp 80-88) 
31. Officer Saunders testified that he yelled at Mr. Smith to "get on 
the ground" and that Mr. Smith complied with this command. (R. 320 p. 110, 
lines 14-22) 
32. Officer Saunders testified that while Officer Kwant was hitting Mr. 
Smith with a baton, Officer Saunders was yelling at him to "quit resisting." (R. 
320 p. I l l , lines 3-14) 
33. In describing Mr. Smith's conduct, umcci rvwciiii LCSUIICU cis 
follows: 
We attempted to tiy to put the hands behind the back, he started 
to pull away from us and started to resist, tightening up his 
muscles in an attempt to pull away from us. He muttered 
something that we know better than do this and we continue to tell 
him, you know, quit resisting us , jus t cooperate and relax. He 
continued to pull away and at one point I think he broke away 
from our grasp and turned around and we immediately tried to 
reattach and regained control of him. 
(R. 320 p. 142, lines 9-17) 
34. Officer Kwant testified that he initiated a "hair pull" take down of 
Mr. Smith and that during the course of this take-down, Mr. Smith's face and 
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head stuck the open door of his vehicle, and Officer Saunders deployed his 
pepper spray on Mr. Smith at that time as well. (R. 320, pp. 144-145) 
35. Officer Kwant acknowledges that while Mr. Smith was face-down 
on the ground, flailing during the subject arrest, his face was being scraped 
across the asphalt. (R. 320, p. 148, lines 18-25 and p. 149, lines 1-2) 
36. Officer Kwant acknowledges striking Mr. Smith with his asp 
baton two to three times on his back shoulder-blade and once in his leg. (R. 
320, p. 151, lines 4-25) 
37. Officer Kwant also witnessed Officer Saunders strike Mr. Smith 
two times in the abdomen with his fist and spray him with pepper-spray on at 
least two occasions as well during the altercation. (R. 320 p. 152, lines 11-25) 
38. Officer Kwant testified that Mr. Smith was screaming throughout 
the physical altercation with the police officers. (R. 320, p. 150, lines 5-8) 
39. Officer Haun testified that when he initially spoke to the 
defendant, Mr. Smith yelled profanities at him and at the other paramedics and 
officers. (R. 319, p. 199, lines 12-15) 
40. In describing the manner in which Mr. Smith was yelling, Officer 
Haun testified as follows: "He was yelling, but when he was yelling, it was 
slowed down. It was taking him a while to blurt things out. It was slurred. It 
was very difficult to understand/ ' (R. 319, p. 200, lines 9-11) 
41 . Officer Haun acknowledged during his testimony that Mr. Smith 
could have been yelling "in pain." (R.319, p. 217, lines 14-18) 
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42. Officer Haun also acknowledged that Mr. Smith was moaning. (R. 
319, p. 218, lines 1-2) 
43. Witness Dolores Lopez testified that she heard Mr. Smith yelling 
and it sounded to her like he was "yelling in pain." (R. 319, p. 271, lines 6-8). 
44. In response to the question "was Mr. Smith yelling anything/' 
witness Mandy Burke testified that she heard Mr. Smith saying "Stop, don't hit 
me," and "stuff like that." (R. 319, p. 280, lines 2-5) 
45. Another witness, Caddo Wadsworth, testified that Mr. Smith was 
"yelling every time a police officer would hit him." According to Mr. 
Wadsworth's observations, Mr. Smith was jus t "reacting" to what the officers 
were doing to him. (R. 319, p. 301, lines 7-21. 
46. The jury was instructed with respect to the elements that the City 
must prove in order for it to convict the defendant of the offense of disorderly 
conduct. Specifically, the court instructed the jury as follows: 
Before you may convict the defendant of the offense of disorderly 
conduct, every one of the following elements must be proved 
beyond a reasonable doubt: 
(1) that the events took place in West Jordan, Salt Lake County, 
Utah; and 
(2) on or about March 7, 2002, the defendant 
(a) after a request to desist, refused to comply with the lawful 
order of the police to move from a public place; OR 
(b) knowingly created a hazardous or physically offensive 
condition by any act which serves no legitimate purpose OR 
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(c) intending to cause public annoyance or alarm or recklessly 
creating a risk thereof (1) engaged in violent, tumultuous or 
threatening behavior; (2) made unreasonable noises in a 
public place; (3) made unreasonable noises in a private place 
which could be heard in a public place; or (4) obstructed 
vehicle or pedestrian traffic. 
(R. 319, p. 328, lines 19-25 and p. 329, lines 1-8) 
47. The City failed to introduce any testimony at trial that Mr. Smith 
was ever asked to move from a public place. 
48. The City failed to introduce any testimony at trial that Mr. Smith 
knowingly created a hazardous or physically offensive condition during the 
subject arrest. 
49. The City failed to introduce any testimony at trial with respect to 
whether any noises made by Mr. Smith during his arrest were reasonable 
and/or unreasonable. 
50. The City failed to introduce any testimony at trial with respect to 
whether Mr. Smith intended to cause public inconvenience annoyance or alarm 
or recklessly created a risk thereof during his arrest. 
VI. SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
Defendant's Motion to Suppress the blood evidence obtained in this case 
should have been granted. Due the condition of the Defendant at the time the 
consent was solicited, as a result of the severe beating and intimidation the 
Defendant had just suffered at the hands of the police officers, the Defendant 
could not have consented to the blood draw and/or any alleged consent 
13 
obtained was not freely and voluntarily given. The trial court's failure to grant 
Defendant's Motion to Suppress constitutes reversible error. 
Defendant should have been allowed to introduce evidence of the police 
officers' prior assaultive behavior during other arrests under Subsection (5) of 
the self-defense statute that allows the introduction of prior acts of violence in 
support of a claim of self-defense. The trial court's failure to allow this 
information into evidence constitutes reversible error. 
Finally, there was insufficient evidence presented at trial to support a 
conviction of the Defendant for the crime of disorderly conduct. Consequently, 
the same should be overturned. 
VII. ARGUMENT 
A. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE 
OBTAINED FROM A BLOOD DRAW WHERE THE DEFENDANT DID 
NOT CONSENT AND WHERE ANY ALLEGED CONSENT WAS NOT 
FREELY AND VOLUNTARILY GIVEN. 
It is well established that "the Fourth Amendment prohibits 
unreasonable searches and seizures, including where the drawing and ensuing 
chemical analysis of blood is concerned." State v. Bredehoft, 966 P.2d 285, 
292 (Utah App. 1998) (citations omitted) Admittedly, a search "conducted 
pursuant to a consent that is voluntary in fact does not violate the fourth 
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consented, nor thai u J M »•* • consent was voluntary ' ')»dini 
nicucxAuit, \M i , .. ^ s s exi:,;., ^
 tx*,d;- .u- -.'v 
oi all \\.- surrounding circumstances—both the character is t ics of the accused 
and the details of police conduct * "~edehoft, 966 P.2d a t 
292 293 (i .itii lg State v. Arrox, 
s. i v >th v. Bus tamopt r *** \H% 22b (1973). Indeed, *[c]onsent is 
%.rpss or coercion, express or 
implied " .State v. Bisner Vf V M i u 7 3 , iuoh j , |cth 2001). As such, in 
iu.u , Miiiiiiig ui i^iher a rirh-mi . ^ "^Hintarily ^onscntcd x~ ~ warrantless 
search • * 
consent was unequivocal and lively given" l^u-dehqft, 966 P 2d it _s_ J 
(< JICIIKHII11 oiiiiiti 11) I i|i;iluiii|i tlii*. drti'iiMinalioii, cour ts look to several 
factors: 
r* > *.* lOtors guiw jic voluntariness determinat ion include (1) tlle 
it»>eiic 1 ;* ity to search by the officers; (2) the absence 
''l an t he officers; (3) a mere reques t to search; (4) 
cooperation K the (party being seair-hen and (4) the absence of 
deception - u 1* oi the part of !hr ol'fv * 
Bredei 
(Utah 1980). See also, Bisner, 37 K3<] at 1088. 
:
-"-: implied consent law and refusal provision does i lot suppor t actual 
vAJii&ent in this case. Importantly, the Utah provisions grant individuals *• * 
ability to refuse with the caveat tha t such refusal, while s topping the bloo< • 
chemical test, will have the consequence of the refusal being mentioned ir 
court See, Utah Code Ann, Section 4 ] 6 44.10. 
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In this case, the arresting officers testified that Mr. Smith resisted arrest, 
was belligerent and uncooperative and denied medical treatment at the scene. 
They also acknowledge that they engaged in a significant physical altercation 
with Mr. Smith during which time Mr. Smith was taken down to the ground by 
a "hair-pull" technique, thrown into the door of his vehicle, with his face and 
head making direct contact with the door's metal frame, pepper-sprayed on two 
occasions, struck by Officer Saunders in the stomach on two occasions, struck 
by Officer Haun's asp baton at least 3 to 4 times, held down to the ground 
while his face was "scraped across the asphalt" and eventually placed in both 
hand and leg restraints. See, Statement of Facts, #1-22 and 27-50. 
Additionally, the evidence presented at the suppression hearing 
established that Officer Haun sought a search warrant for the blood draw and 
included a statement in his Affidavit in support of that warrant that Mr. Smith 
had refused a chemical test. Id. The officers admitted that Mr. Smith had 
sustained significant injuries during the physical altercation and was receiving 
medical treatment at the hospital when Officer Haun asked him to consent to 
the blood test. Id. Under the circumstances of Mr. Smith's physical and 
mental condition at the time Officer Haun requested his consent, as well as the 
proximity in time of the Officer's request to the beating Mr. Smith had jus t 
received at the hands of the West Jordan police officers, Defendant contends 
that any alleged consent on his part was not voluntarily given. Accordingly, 
the trial court should have suppressed the blood evidence obtained in this 
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>f I S 
error not to do so. 
I HE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO ALLOW THE DEFENSE 
FO INTRODUCE EVIDENCE OF PRIOR ASSAULTIVE BEHAVIOR OF 
THE ARRESTING OFFICERS PURSUANT TO THE SELF-DEFENSE 
STATUTE THAT ALLOWS EVIDENCE OF PRIOR VIOLENCE. 
poenaed p e r s o n s . .in > ••» i h u i ->i mc arrest ing 
officers. ^ ! ><!-] 25) At trial, counsel sought to questioi 1 1:1 le officers 
concerning dllcfcttuwns of prior unreasonable beatings dm ing arrest *T \20 .1 
p., x 11 >; 1 in* - ' 
of ttu1 juiv. (k '*; .\\ pi 16-124) in ? 11s questioning ibofh had <*uiu> fiica 
against llinji, ,111 Il 1 Jii' had hren accused on two pi ior occasions of 
overzealousnes ; 1 \u- district courL indge found tha t such evid* - < >.• -
adin.vS^iLA uiiw no self-defense statute, (R. 320 a t pp 125-l'2ttJ This ruling 
was erroneous and shot ! ! 1, 
Section 76-2-402 <>J --•- Utah t 'ode is known as the self-defense s ta tute 
ind 1 mi 1 jvidrs tlri! 1 pi iM IN mi |iir nim 11 HI threatening or usir lg force against 
ano ther when and to the r <;ent tha t ho or shf reasonably believes thai Imnv IM 
M< « t"'^-' I. ^...u »ii i ;^ o n r o inst s u u i other 's imminent use ot unlawful 
force »-uth Code Ann., Section 76-2-402 i| 11 , n d n Sn linn | ' i | nil 111,m 1 MUNI 
pr'#vi-,i(jn, the s ta tu te provides, in relevant p a n , as follows: 
r-fi it,U;iii,u,j.M ".mA,ut uabui iauie i iess u n d e r Subsection 
(1), the trier of fact may consider, bi it is not limited to, any of the 
•.• following factors: 
(a) the na tu re of the danger; 
(b) the immediacy of the danger; 
(c) the probability that the unlawful force would result in 
death or serious bodily injury; 
(d) the other's prior violent acts or violent propensities; 
and 
(e) any patterns of abuse or violence in the parties' 
relationship. 
(Emphasis added). 
In the present case, both Officers Saunders and Kwant had reports in 
their personnel files of claims being made against them for the excessive use of 
force, including a civil lawsuit that was filed naming said officers in connection 
with the brutal beating of an individual during his arrest. Under the subject 
statute, it is clear that the fact finder should be allowed to consider evidence of 
the officers' prior violent acts or violent propensities. The trial court should 
have allowed this information to be admitted into evidence and its failure to do 
so constitutes reversible error. Consequently, Defendant asks this court to 
reverse the trial court's ruling on this issue and remand for further 
proceedings. 
C. THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED IN THIS CASE IS INSUFFICIENT TO 
REASONABLY SUPPORT A CONVICTION FOR DISORDERLY 
CONDUCT. 
The disorderly conduct statute requires the satisfaction of certain 
elements before a conviction for the offense may stand. Specifically, in order to 
sustain its burden on this crime, the City must prove one of three alternative 
elements in order to obtain a conviction. The first alternative that would 
establish disorderly conduct is that the Defendant refused to comply with the 
lawful order of the police to move from a public place. In the present case, the 
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City failed to inlMxIin c iwiy l< slnnoih, nil lii.il lluil I" '"Ii. I'mulli utii. \ w I »i..k< d 
(let alone refused) to move from a public place. Consequently, the Defendant's 
::::(: i i \ ictioi 1 is not suppoi ted i u idei tl lis alternative element of the crime. 
The second alternative e lement is tha t the Defendant knowingly \ irratnl .) 
haza rdous or physically offensive condition. Siniilarly, in the present case, the 
i mi h , f*, 1 1 1 c » ( I ( 1 1 11 in il  mi I H 1 1 1 1 I • : 1 1 1 v 1 ( » s 1 1 1 1 1 * >1 in'«» 11 1 1 1 < i ( 1 1 1 . 1 1 I1" 1 1 ' I in 1 1 1 1 1 1 I » 1 1 1 1 \ "i' i i i jr» I \ i 1 1 \ . i ( e d 
a hazardous or physically offensive condition during his arrest , Thus , the 
u . :-JII( "s ("IIII'IMK (inn Inn disorderly conduct i-s no I suppor ted by this 
alternative element n f tb^cntn / - . 
i iiitih'v, .... Miiu -.IM i uruivo unde r which th-~ r*itv r an prove a defendant 
i!iiiiiv oi disoidcir conduct -o..! s !. < <• . Mutiiiit*. 
c ause public inconvenience, annoyance , or alarm. - lucklessly created a risk 
• * * • *-..*. -i;<i\;i-11 . - * \ : - * - .., . im19 nr threatening 
behavioi iJi made unreasonable noises in • TU.KJI. .|»*W ^ ii lc tde 
unreasonable U^L.C^ ,* -
 r i i w m nlavA vvliu,n can be h e a p : m a public place; or 
(4) obstructed vehicular* or pedest r ian traffic See, Utah Code Ann., S e d m o Vi -
- M ) ? f 1953, as amended), IT^ Vr mis .'iternative !w<; e lements m u s t be 
i 
int roduce any evidence tha t would establish tha t the Defendant acted with the 
intention of causing pnMi< mroiivcnience, annoyance or nlarm or that h~ 
recklessly created the risk thereof. Consequently, Dei— - il \ i in i n n IN nat 
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the court need not go any further in its analysis of the third alternative, 
because the first prong has not been satisfied. 
Assuming arguendo that this Court disagrees, Defendant directs the 
Court's attention to the second element of the third alternative for further 
examination. Specifically, Defendant acknowledges that there was testimony 
presented during trial that there was yelling and screaming and that he was 
verbally offensive. However, this testimony, alone, is insufficient to satisfy all 
of the elements necessary to support a conviction for disorderly conduct. 
Noise, alone, is not enough. In addition to proof that the defendant was 
"intending" to cause or "recklessly" caused public inconvenience, alarm or 
annoyance, there must also be proof that the noise made by the defendant was 
"unreasonable noise." See, State v. Richards, 779 P.2d 689 (Utah App. 1989) 
(emphasis added). In the present case, the testimony as a whole establishes 
that the noise made by Mr. Smith during his arrest was not unreasonable. 
Specifically, Officer Saunders admitted during his testimony that during 
the altercation between the officers and Mr. Smith, the officers stuck Mr. Smith 
several times with batons and fists, pepper-sprayed him twice, took him down 
to the ground with a "hair pull" maneuver and that the officers were "yelling" 
at Mr. Smith to stop resisting. (R. 320, pp 80-88) Officer Saunders testified 
that he yelled at Mr. Smith to "get on the ground" and that Mr. Smith 
complied with this command. (R. 320 p. 110, lines 14-22) Officer Saunders 
further testified that while Officer Kwant was hitting Mr. Smith with a baton, 
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Officer Saunders was yelling at him to ut 
3 14) 
In ,1 ••- * ' "i ! "-iitilh"". « uinl'ii I, ( Mfirri I1, ,MIII "I stihcd as iollows: 
Wt .a tempted to try to put die h a n d s behind the back, he started 
to pull away from us and star ted to resist, t ightening u p his 
*'les in an a t tempt to pull away from u s . He muttered 
thing that we know better than do this a n d we continu • I I il 
vou know, qui t resisting u s , j u s t cooperate and relax. 11c 
continued to pull away and a t one point I th ink he broke away 
fr ;-.. our grasp and turned a round and we immediately tried to • 
re.iMac! 'us:! iegained control of him 
(R. 320 p. x i2, lines 9-17) 
Officer Kwant testified tha t he initiated, a "hair pull" take down of Mr. 
6mii!* ! < • • . face and in ad 
stuck die open dour <>! his vehicle, and < >ffirer Saunders deployed his j ti*% ;i 
Npra) i Mi I'l Hi nl 11 ml lime as \\ . * ^ M'1 * >, Officei -w;n>' 
acknowledges tha t while Mr. Smith was face-dov 
dur ing the subject arrest , his face was being scraped across the asphal* (k. 
320 n M8, lines 18-'>Sainl p I I'"!, II111 1 | H|n i I- - « "' » ..H.,. r 
acknowledges striking Mr. Smith with his a sp baton tw*> -' throe times uh lno 
k'liu k ' i l i u i i l d e i l iLid t MI M I in i r n imp lcj.;, (IN. d . U ) , p 1 M , * S 4 2C>) O f f i 
Kwant also witnessed Officer Saunde r s strike Mr. Smith two t imes in the 
** . md spray him., with pepper-spray on a t least two 
occasions as well dur ing the alterral mi 11" > 'i I 11 I" i "' I < I l /»l if i 111 n < -i 
Kwant testified tha t Mr. Smith was screnming throughout the phvsirai 
alter* atifiii wilh lln pnlii c nl'lii
 fcA,, , IM u^nt oi what 
was happening to Mr. Smith at the hands of the police officers, Defendant 
asserts that any noise he was making was reasonable. 
Officer Haun testified that when he initially spoke to the defendant, Mr. 
Smith yelled profanities at him and at the other paramedics and officers. (R. 
319, p. 199, lines 12-15) In describing the manner in which Mr. Smith was 
yelling, Officer Haun testified as follows: "He was yelling, but when he was 
yelling, it was slowed down. It was taking him a while to blurt things out. It 
was slurred. It was very difficult to understand." (R. 319, p. 200, lines 9-11) 
Officer Haun acknowledged during his testimony that Mr. Smith could have 
been yelling "in pain." (R.319, p. 217, lines 14-18) Officer Haun also 
acknowledged that Mr. Smith was moaning. (R. 319, p. 218, lines 1-2) 
Witness Dolores Lopez testified that she heard Mr. Smith yelling and it 
sounded to her like he was "yelling in pain." (R. 319, p. 271, lines 6-8). In 
response to the question "was Mr. Smith yelling anything," witness Mandy 
Burke testified that she heard Mr. Smith saying "Stop, don't hit me," and 
"stuff like that." (R. 319, p. 280, lines 2-5) Another witness, Caddo 
Wadsworth, testified that Mr. Smith was "yelling every time a police officer 
would hit him." According to Mr. Wadsworth's observations, Mr. Smith was 
jus t "reacting" to what the officers were doing to him. (R. 319, p. 301, lines 7-
21 . 
When read in context, the testimony regarding the noises made by 
Defendant during his arrest establishes that the noises were not unreasonable 
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and were, inlan/c part ill nni i IIIIM ly, aiinbiiuixik nn int. uaitlnn i aim ai nous m 
the police officers, who, by their own testimony acknowledge that they were 
*yelli"K" a l M '" " " ' ,1,s u" ll ' '"' ' ' 
Based upon the forev^u<\ Defendant contrnds flial tin* t'vidrn< i 
presented at trial was insuiiicient to support .» conviction of disorderly conduct 
and reqi ies^ 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
r •* o . ioiL^-jii^ Defei idant asks this vourt to (1) find *hat the 
trial court errcu +u lailin?* »•- «rant Defendant's M^  • • - t 
ruling and remand to the aiai court for further proceedings; (2) find m •> *l< 
trial court cm " * . luii^i .;<;...
 r * ,s e 
officers' prior assaultive behavior in c-imct tion wuli eiieclmg arrests, icvcibc 
llii' iiiiiii)1, and in aiamll In llliu liiiiaJ toml Jui lui Ihcr proceeding; and/ or (3) find 
that there was insufficient evidence presented to suppoi I il l in IIIIIII \ 's i nni in in ii 
nf
 .>iLti\i> u ,* * ! mi ' disorderly conduct and reverse the same, 
RESPECTH:L;,\ i.l M if/, i'lTM '(I, , > / .? d - « " " /('.ill 
MORTON & CARMICHAEL, L.C. 
JAMES JpMORfforf v -
JWCQU^YNN D. CARMICHAEL 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant 
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41-6-44.8 MOTOR VEHICLES 776 
41-6-44.8. Municipal at torneys for specified offenses 
may prosecute for certain DUI offenses and 
driving wh i l e l i cense is suspended or re-
voked. 
The following class A misdemeanors may be prosecuted by 
attorneys of cities and towns, as well as by prosecutors 
authorized elsewhere in this code to prosecute these alleged 
violations: 
(1) alleged class A misdemeanor violations of Section 
41-6-44; and 
(2) alleged violations of Section 53-3-227, which consist 
of the person operating a vehicle while the person's 
driving privilege is suspended or revoked for a violation of 
Section 41-6-44, a local ordinance which complies with the 
requirements of Section 41-6-43, Section 41-6-44.10, Sec-
tion 76-5-207, or a criminal prohibition tha t the person 
was charged with violating as a result of a plea bargain 
after having been originally charged with violating one or 
more of those sections or ordinances. 1996 
41-6-44.10. Implied consent to chemical tests for alco-
hol or drug — Number of tests — Refusal — 
Warning, report — Hearing, revocat ion of li-
cense —Appeal — Person incapable of refusal 
— Resul t s of test available — Who may give 
test — Evidence . 
(1) (a) A person operating a motor vehicle in this state is 
considered to have given his consent to a chemical test or 
tests of his breath, blood, or urine for the purpose of 
determining whether he was operating or in actual phys-
ical control of a motor vehicle while having a blood or 
breath alcohol content statutorily prohibited under Sec-
tion 41-6-44, 53-3-231, or 53-3-232, while under the influ-
ence of alcohol, any drug, or combination of alcohol and 
any drug under Section 41-6-44, or while having any 
measurable controlled substance or metabolite of a con-
trolled substance in the person's body in violation of 
Section 41-6-44.6, if the test is or tests are administered 
at the direction of a peace officer having grounds to 
believe that person to have been operating or in actual, 
physical control of a motor vehicle while having a blood or 
breath alcohol content statutorily prohibited under Sec-
tion 41-6-44, 53-3-231, or 53-3-232, or while under the 
influence of alcohol, any drug, or combination of alcohol 
and any drug under Section 41-6-44, or while having any 
measurable controlled substance or metabolite of a con-
trolled substance in the person's body in violation of 
Section 41-6-44.6. 
(b) (i) The peace officer determines which of the tests 
are administered and how many of them are admin-
istered. 
(ii) If an officer requests more than one test, re-
fusal by a person to take one or more requested tests, 
even though he does submit to any other requested 
test or tests, is a refusal under this section. 
(c) (i) A person who has been requested under this 
section to submit to a chemical test or tests of his 
breath, blood, or urine, may not select the test or tests 
to be administered. 
(ii) The failure or inability of a peace officer to 
arrange for any specific chemical test is not a defense 
to taking a test requested by a peace officer, and it is 
not a defense in any criminal, civil, or administrative 
proceeding resulting from a person's refusal to submit 
to the requested test or tests. 
(2) (a) If the person has been placed under arrest, has then 
been requested by a peace officer to submit to any one or 
more of the chemical tests under Subsection (1), and 
refuses to submit to any chemical test requested, the 
person shall be warned by the peace officer requesting the 
test or tests tha t a refusal to submit to the test or tests can 
result in revocation of the person's license to operate a 
motor vehicle. 
(b) Following the warning under Subsection (2)(a), if 
the person does not immediately request tha t the chemi-
cal test or tests as offered by a peace officer be adminis-
tered a peace officer shall serve on the person, on behalf of 
the Driver License Division, immediate notice of the 
Driver License Division's intention to revoke the person's 
privilege or license to operate a motor vehicle. When the 
officer serves the immediate notice on behalf of the Driver 
License Division, he shall: 
(i) take the Utah license certificate or permit, if 
any, of the operator; 
(ii) issue a temporary license effective for only 29 
days; and 
(iii) supply to the operator, on a form approved by 
the Driver License Division, basic information re-
garding how to obtain a hearing before the Driver 
License Division. 
(c) A citation issued by a peace officer may, if approved 
as to form by the Driver License Division, serve also as 
the temporary license. 
(d) As a matter of procedure, the peace officer shall 
submit a signed report, within ten calendar days after the 
date of the arrest, that he had grounds to believe the 
arrested person had been operating or was in actual 
physical control of a motor vehicle while having a blood or 
breath alcohol content statutorily prohibited under Sec-
tion 41-6-44, 53-3-231, or 53-3-232, or while under the 
influence of alcohol, any drug, or combination of alcohol 
and any drug under Section 41-6-44, or while having any 
measurable controlled substance or metabolite of a con-
trolled substance in the person's body in violation of 
Section 41-6-44.6, and that the person had refused to 
submit to a chemical test or tests under Subsection (1). 
(e) (i) A person who has been notified of the Driver 
License Division's intention to revoke his license 
under this section is entitled to a hearing. 
(ii) A request for the hearing shall be made in 
writing within ten calendar days after the date of the 
arrest. 
(iii) Upon written request, the division shall grant 
to the person an opportunity to be heard within 29 
days after the date of arrest. 
(iv) If the person does not make a timely written 
request for a hearing before the division, his privilege 
to operate a motor vehicle in the state is revoked 
beginning on the 30th day after the date of arrest for 
a period of: 
(A) 18 months unless Subsection (2)(e)(iv)(B) 
applies; or 
(B) 24 months if the person has had a previous 
license sanction after July 1, 1993, under this 
section, Section 41-6-44.6, 53-3-223, 53-3-231, 
53-3-232, or a conviction after July 1, 1993, 
under Section 41-6-44. 
(f) If a hearing is requested by the person, the hearing 
shall be conducted by the Driver License Division in the 
county in which the offense occurred, unless the division 
and the person both agree that the hearing may be held in 
some other county 
(g) The hearing shall be documented and shall cover 
the issues of. 
(i) whether a peace officer had reasonable grounds 
to believe that a person was operating a motor vehicle 
in violation of Section 41-6-44, 41-6-44.6, or 53-3-231; 
and 
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(ii) whether the person refused to submit to the 
test, 
(h) (i) In connection with the hearing, the division or 
its authorized agent: 
(A> may admmistei oattvs aivd may issue sub-
poenas for the attendance of witnesses and the 
production of relevant books and papers; and 
(B) shall issue subpoenas for the attendance of 
necessary peace officers, 
(ii) The division shall pay witness fees and mileage 
from the Transportation Fund in accordance with the 
rates established in Section 78-46-28. 
(i) If after a hearing, the Driver License Division deter-
mines that the person was requested to submit to a 
chemical test or tests and refused to submit to the test or 
tests, or if the person fails to appear before the Driver 
License Division as required in the notice, the Driver 
License Division shall revoke his license or permit to 
operate a motor vehicle in Utah beginning on the date the 
hearing is held for a period of: 
(i) (A) 18 months unless Subsection (2)(iXiXB) ap-
plies; or 
(B) 24 months if the person has had a previous 
license sanction after July 1, 1993, under this 
section, Section 41-6-44.6, 53-3-223, 53-3-231, 
53-3-232, or a conviction after July 1, 1993, 
under Section 41-6-44. 
(ii) The Driver License Division shall also assess 
against the person, in addition to any fee imposed 
under Subsection 53-3-205(13), a fee under Section 
53-3-105, which shall be paid before the person's 
driving privilege is reinstated, to cover administra-
tive costs. 
(iii) The fee shall be cancelled if the person obtains 
an unappealed court decision following a proceeding 
allowed under this Subsection (2) tha t the revocation 
was improper, 
(j) (i) Any person whose license has been revoked by 
the Driver License Division under this section may 
seek judicial review. 
(ii) Judicial review of an informal adjudicative 
proceeding is a trial. Venue is in the district court in 
the county in which the offense occurred. 
(3) Any person who is dead, unconscious, or in any other 
condition rendering him incapable of refusal to submit to any 
chemical test or tests is considered to not have withdrawn the 
consent provided for in Subsection (1), and the test or tests 
may be administered whether the person has been arrested or 
not. 
(4) Upon the request of the person who was tested, the 
results of the test or tests shall be made available to him. 
(5) (a) Only a physician, registered nurse, practical nurse, 
or person authorized under Section 26-1-30, acting at the 
request of a peace officer, may withdraw blood to deter-
mine the alcoholic or drug content. This limitation does 
not apply to taking a urine or breath specimen. 
(b) Any physician, registered nurse, practical nurse, or 
person authorized under Section 26-1-30 who, at the 
direction of a peace officer, draws a sample of blood from 
any person whom a peace officer has reason to believe is 
driving in violation of this chapter, or hospital or medical 
facility at which the sample is drawn, is immune from any 
civil or criminal liability arising from drawing the sample, 
.if the test is administered according to standard medical 
practice. 
(6) (a) The person to be tested may, at his own expense, 
have a physician of his own choice administer a chemical 
test in addition to the test or tests administered at the 
direction of a peace officer. 
(b) The failure or inability to obtain the additional test 
does not affect admissibility of the results of the test or 
tests taken at the direction of a peace officer, or preclude 
or delay the test or tests to be taken at the direction of a 
peace office*. 
(c) The additional test shall be subsequent to the test 
or tests administered at the direction of a peace officer. 
(7) For the purpose of determining whether to submit to a 
chemical test or tests, the person to be tested does not have the 
right to consult an attorney or have an attorney, physician, or 
other person present as a condition for the taking of any test. 
(8) If a person under arrest refuses to submit to a chemical 
test or tests or any additional test under this section, evidence 
of any refusal is admissible in any civil or criminal action or 
proceeding arising out of acts alleged to have been committed 
while the person was operating or in actual physical control of 
a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, any drug, 
combination of alcohol and any drug, or while having any 
measurable controlled substance or metabolite of a controlled 
substance in the person's body. 2002 
41-6-44.11. Repealed. m i 
41-6-44.12. Reporting test results — Immunity from 
liability. 
(1) As used in this section, "health care provider" means a ' 
person licensed under Title 58, Chapter 31b, Nurse Practice 
Act, Title 58, Chapter 67, Utah Medical Practice Act, or Title 
58, Chapter 68, Utah Osteopathic Medical Practice Act. 
(2) A health care provider who is providing medical care to 
any person involved in a motor vehicle crash may notify, a s 
soon as reasonably possible, the nearest peace officer or law 
enforcement agency if the health care provider has reason to 
believe, as a result of any test performed in the course of 
medical treatment, that the: 
(a) person's blood alcohol concentration meets or ex-
ceeds the limit under Subsection 41-6-44(2)(a)(i) or (iii); 
(b) person is younger than 21 years of age and has any 
measurable blood, breath, or urine alcohol concentration 
in the person's body; or 
(c) person has any measurable controlled substance or 
metabolite of a controlled substance in the person's body 
which could be a violation of Subsection 41-6-44(2)(a)(ii) 
or Section 41-6-44.6. 
(3) The report under Subsection (2) shall consist of the: 
(a) name of the person being treated; 
(b) date and time of the administration of the test; and 
(c) results disclosed by the test. 
(4) A health care provider participating in good faith in 
making a report or assisting an investigator from a law 
enforcement agency pursuant to this section is immune from 
any liability, civil or criminal, that otherwise might result by 
reason of those actions. 
(5) A report under Subsection (2) may not be used to 
support a finding of probable cause that a person who is not a 
driver ofa vehicle has committed an offense. 2002 
41-6-44.20. Drinking alcoholic beverage and open con-
tainers in motor vehicle prohibited — Defini-
t ions — Exceptions. 
(1) A person may not drink any alcoholic beverage while 
operating a motor vehicle or while a passenger in a motor 
vehicle, whether the vehicle is moving, stopped, or parked on 
any highway. 
(2) A person may not keep, carry, possess, transport, or 
allow another to keep, carry, possess, or transport in the 
passenger compartment ofa motor vehicle, when the vehicle is 
on any highway, any container which contains any alcoholic 
beverage if the container has been opened, its seal broken, or 
the contents of the container partially consumed. 
Exhibit B 
UTAH CRIMINAL CODE 76-2-404 
irSttntary intoxication. 
^toxication shall not be a defense to a criminal 
^sach intoxication negates the existence of the 
^hich is an element of "the ofiense; 'howeveT, li 
J& criminal negligence establishes an element of 
^k-the actor is unaware of the risk because of 
N-nxication, his unawareness is immaterial in a 
toTthat offense. 1973 
Voluntary termination of efforts prior to of-
fense. 
Efinnative defense to a prosecution in which an 
nal responsibility arises from his own conduct or 
r\a party to an offense under Section 76-2-202 that 
tie commission of the offense, the actor voluntarily 
This effort to promote or facilitate its commission 
ave timely warning to the proper law enforcement 
Jies or the intended victim; or 
Wholly deprives his prior efforts of effectiveness in 
oission. 1&95 
I* Affirmative defenses . 
enumerated in this part constitute affirmative 
1973 
PART 4 
JUSTIFICATION EXCLUDING CRIMINAL 
RESPONSIBILITY 
76$-401. Justification as defense — When al lowed. 
(i) Conduct which is justified is a defense to prosecution for 
a-f offense based on the conduct. The defense of justification 
^ y j e claimed. 
^ a ) when the actor's conduct is in defense of persons or 
property under the circumstances described in Sections 
76-2-402 through 76-2-406 of this part; 
t 4b) when the actor's conduct is reasonable and in ful-
fillment of his duties as a governmental officer or eir 
ployee; 
t (c) when the actor's conduct is reasonable discipline, of 
minors by parents, guardians, teachers, or other persohs 
in loco parentis, as limited by Subsection (2); 
• (d) when the actor's conduct is reasonable discipline of 
persons in custody under the laws of the state; or 
(e) when the actor's conduct is justified for any other 
reason under the laws of this state. 
(2) The defense of justification under Subsection (l)(c) is not 
available if the offense charged involves causing serious bodily 
lnjU1^ a s defined in Section 76-1-601, serious physical injury, 
as defined in Section 76-5-109, or the death of the minor. 
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7S-2-402. Force in defense of person — Forcible felony 
defined. 
against another when and to the extent that he or she 
reasonably believes that force is necessary to defend himself 
or a third person against such other's imminent use of 
unlawful force. However, that person is justified in using force 
intended or likely to cause death or serious bodily injury only 
if he or she reasonably believes that force is necessary to 
prevent death or serious bodily injury to himself or a third 
person as a result of the other's imminent use of unlawful 
force, or to prevent the commission of a forcible felony. 
(2) A person is not justified in using force under the circum-
stances specified in Subsection (1) if he or she* 
(a) initially provokes the use of force against himself 
with the intent to use force as an excuse to inflict bodily 
harm upon the assailant; 
(b) is attempting to commit, committing, or fleeing 
after the commission or attempted commission of a felony; 
of 
\c) \*i) was the aggressor or was engagebfm a conibaVby 
agreement, unless he withdraws from the encounter 
and effectively communicates to the other person his 
intent to do so and, notwithstanding, the other person 
continues or threatens to continue the use of unlaw-
ful force; and 
(ii) for purposes of Subsection (i) the following do 
not, by themselves, constitute "combat by agree-
ment": 
(A) voluntarily entering into or remaining in 
an ongoing relationship; or 
(B) entering or remaining in a place where one 
has a legal right to be. 
(3) A person does not have a duty to retreat from the force 
or th r e a t e n e a < f°rce described in Subsection (1) in a place 
wher^ ^hat person has lawfully entered or remained, except as 
provided in Subsection (2Xc). 
(4) For purposes of this section, a forcible felony includes 
aggr#vaked assault, mayhem, aggravated murder, murder, 
m a nglaughter, kidnapping, and aggravated kidnapping, rape, 
forcib^e sodomy, rape of a child, object rape, object rape of a 
child sexual abuse of a child, aggravated sexual abuse of a 
child, ana* aggravated sexual assault as defined in Title 76, 
Chapter 5, and arson, robbery, and burglary as defined in Title 
75 chapter 6. Any other felony offense which involves the use 
of force o r violence against a person so as to create a substan-
tial d a n £ e r °f death or serious bodily injury also constitutes a 
forcible felony. Burglary of a vehicle, defined in Section 76-6-
204 does not constitute a forcible felony except when the 
vehicle is occupied at J-**^ *™™- ^la^f^i entry is made or 
attei**Pted 
(5) Iii determining imminence or reasonableness under 
Subsection (1), the trier of fact may consider, b\jt is not limited 
co aJiy °f the following factors. 
(a) the nature of the danger; 
(b) the immediacy of the danger; 
(c) the probability that the unlawful force would result 
jn death or serious bodily injury; 
(d) the other's prior violent acts or.violent propensities; 
#nd 
(e) any patterns of abuse or violence in the parties' 
j-elationship. 1994 
76-2^03' Force in arrest. 
A$y person is justified in using any force, except deadly 
force» w n i c h he reasonably believes to be necessary to effect an 
arre^ o r t° defend himself or another from bodily harm while 
makin& a n arrest. 1973 
76-2'404. P ea ce officer's use of deadly force. 
(1) A peace officer, or any person acting by his command in 
his a*d* and assistance, is justified in using deadly force when: 
Ca.\ thft officer is acting ux Qtadi&ace. to and ux accor-
dance with the judgment of a competent court in execut-
ing a penalty of death; 
(b) effecting an arrest or preventing an escape from 
custody following an arrest, where the officer reasonably 
believes that deadly force is necessary to prevent the 
arrest from being defeated by escape; and 
(i) the officer has probable cause to believe that the 
suspect has committed a felony offense involving the 
infliction or threatened infliction of death or serious 
bodily injury; or 
(ii) the officer has probable cause to believe the 
suspect poses a threat of death or serious bodily 
injury to the officer or to others if apprehension is 
delayed; 
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P A R T I 
BREACHES OF THE PEACE AND RELATED 
O F F E N S E S 
76-9-101. Riot — Penal t ies . 
(1) A person is guilty of riot if: 
(a) simultaneously with two or more other persons h 
engages in tumultuous or violent conduct and thereh 
knowingly or recklessly creates a substantial risk f 
causing public alarm; or 
(b) he assembles with two or more other persons with 
the purpose of engaging, soon thereafter, in tumultuous or 
violent conduct, knowing, that two or more other persons 
in the assembly have the same purpose; or 
(c) he assembles with two or more other persons with 
the purpose of committing an offense against a person or 
property of another who he supposes to be guilty of a 
violation of law, believing that two or more other persons 
in the assembly have the same purpose. 
(2) Any person who refuses to comply with a lawful order to 
withdraw given to him immediately prior to, during, or 
immediately following a violation of Subsection (1) is guilty of 
riot. It is no defense to a prosecution under this Subsection (2) 
that withdrawal must take place over private property; pro-
vided, however, tha t no persons so withdrawing shall incur 
criminal or civil liability by virtue of acts reasonably necessary 
to accomplish the withdrawal. 
(3) Riot is a felony of the third degree if, in the course of and 
as a result of the conduct, any person suffers bodily injury, or 
substantial property damage, arson occurs or the defendant 
was armed with a dangerous weapon, as defined in Section 
76-1-601; otherwise it is a class B misdemeanor 1997 
76-9-102. D i s o r d e r l y c o n d u c t . 
(1) A person is guilty of disorderly conduct if: 
(a) he refuses to comply with the lawful order of the 
police to move from a public place, or knowingly creates a 
hazardous or physically offensive condition, by any act 
which serves no legitimate purpose; or 
(b) intending to cause public inconvenience, annoy-
ance, or alarm, or recklessly creating a risk thereof, he* 
(i) engages in fighting or in violent, tumultuous, or 
threatening behavior; 
(ii) makes unreasonable noises in a public place; 
(iii) makes unreasonable noises in a private place 
which can be heard in a public place; or 
(iv) obstructs vehicular or pedestrian traffic. 
(2) "Public place," for the purpose of this section, means any 
place to which the public or a substantial group of the public 
has access and includes but is not limited to streets, highways, 
and the common areas of schools, hospitals, apartment 
houses, office buildings, transport facilities, and shops. 
(3) Disorderly conduct is a class C misdemeanor if the 
offense continues after a request by a person to desist. 
Otherwise it is an infraction. 1 9 9 9 
76-9-103. Disrupt ing a mee t ing o r procession. 
(1) A person is guilty of disrupting a meeting or procession 
if, intending to prevent or disrupt a lawful meeting, proces-
sion, or gathering, he obstructs or interferes with the meeting, 
procession, or gathering by physical action, verbal utterance, 
or any other means. 
(2) Disrupting a meeting or procession is a class B misde-
meanor. 1973 
76-9-104. F a i l u r e t o d i s p e r s e . 
( 1 ) A person is guilty of failure to disperse when he remains 
at the scene of a riot, disorderly conduct, or an unlawful 
assembly after having been ordered to disperse by a peace 
officer. 
